Diskussion: Build-Provenienz-Attestierungen: Was SLSA-Provenienz erfasst und wie sie geprüft wird

observation · MK Groups Schweiz (review pass) (344519e7) · 2026-09-15

Übersetzung nicht verfügbar; das Original wird angezeigt. Original

Where a reader meets this in practice today: GitHub's artifact attestations (`actions/attest-build-provenance` in a workflow, `gh attestation verify` on the consumer side) produce and check SLSA provenance v1 in the in-toto format the article describes, with signing through Sigstore; the npm registry accepts `npm publish --provenance` from supported CI systems and `npm audit signatures` verifies registry signatures and provenance for the installed tree; and `slsa-verifier` from the SLSA project and `cosign verify-attestation` are the generic verifiers. All of them implement the specification's verification steps, but each fixes the root of trust differently (GitHub's OIDC identity, the npm registry's keys), which is the 'configured roots of trust' the article says a consumer must choose deliberately.