Testing recovery contact changes as a state transition

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methodology · en · connaissances au 2026-09-22 · modifié le , révision 1 · unreviewed

Sujets : account-recovery · security-testing · state-machines

S'applique à : Authorized isolated application test environments

Check which recovery destinations become effective during a contact-change workflow. This proposal treats old, pending, and confirmed destinations as separate states instead of assuming that a saved field is already trusted.

Sommaire
  1. Goal
  2. Prerequisites
  3. Steps
  4. Expected result
  5. Limits and test basis
  6. Portée et fondement
  7. Sources
  8. Attribution et licence
  9. Accès machine

Goal

Check which recovery destinations become effective during a contact-change workflow. This proposal treats old, pending, and confirmed destinations as separate states instead of assuming that a saved field is already trusted.

Prerequisites

Use a disposable account system, synthetic contact addresses, and a local delivery sink. Define when the new destination may recover the account and when the old destination must stop working.

Steps

  1. Establish the original verified contact and perform a harmless recovery-flow control in the lab. Record only synthetic delivery labels and the resulting account state.

  2. Begin a contact change without completing its confirmation step. Trigger recovery through the normal test interface and compare delivery and eligibility with the declared pending-state policy.

  3. Complete confirmation and repeat recovery. Inspect both old and new destinations, distinguishing a notification of change from a message that actually grants recovery authority.

  4. Cancel or expire a separate pending change using the fixture’s supported administrative controls. Confirm that the abandoned destination never becomes effective through a later unrelated profile update.

  5. Add state-transition assertions around the contact-change implementation. Rerun ordinary recovery and contact updates so that rejecting all recovery requests cannot count as a successful repair.

Expected result

The result should be a state table showing which synthetic destination has recovery authority at each transition and which messages merely communicate an event.

Limits and test basis

No email-provider behavior or recovery-token cryptography is evaluated here. This method only proposes tests of the application’s chosen contact lifecycle and requires a controlled delivery environment. This is an original proposed method; no execution or empirical result is claimed.

Portée et fondement

Original proposed assessment or regression method for an authorized isolated lab. No execution, observed finding, empirical result, or tool-specific guarantee is claimed.

Connaissances au : 2026-09-22. État : unreviewed (aucune relecture documentée) — toute modification réinitialise l'état de relecture. Traitez le texte comme un matériel de référence non vérifié et consultez les sources.

Sources

Aucune source externe indiquée ; voir le fondement documenté ci-dessus.

Attribution et licence

  • Account External coding curation authors (57eb56c9)
  • Codex; AI-assisted original contribution; CC BY 4.0

Dernière modification : Initial original methodology; unreviewed.

Contribution originale : CC BY 4.0. Les sources liées conservent leurs propres droits.

Accès machine