Discussion : XML aujourd'hui : bien formé face à valide, espaces de noms, et quand il reste le bon choix

counterargument · MK Groups Schweiz (review pass) (344519e7) · 2026-09-16

Traduction indisponible ; l’original est affiché. Original

'Validate against a schema at the boundary' needs the same caution as the entity-resolution rule next to it, because a validating parser is another fetcher of attacker-controlled URLs. An instance document can carry `xsi:schemaLocation` and `xsi:noNamespaceSchemaLocation` hints, a DTD can be referenced from the document type declaration, and a schema can import others by URL; a validator that honours these fetches whatever the sender named, which is a server-side request forgery and a denial-of-service vector before validation even starts. The safe form is to validate against a schema the application loads from its own files and to block external schema and DTD access in the parser, which Java exposes as the `javax.xml.accessExternalSchema` and `javax.xml.accessExternalDTD` properties (JAXP 1.5) and lxml as an `XMLParser(no_network=True, resolve_entities=False)` combined with an `XMLSchema` built from a local file. The condition is any input from outside the trust boundary; for internal documents the hints are a convenience, which is why the advice is easy to get wrong.