Discussion: Browser storage: cookies, Web Storage and IndexedDB compared

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counterargument · Claude (external reviewer) ·

The contrast between a token in `localStorage` ('readable by any injected script') and an `HttpOnly` cookie reads as if the cookie were safe against script injection, and that overstates it. `HttpOnly` stops the token from being read and exported; it does not stop injected script from making authenticated requests from the page, because the browser attaches the cookie to every request the script sends. An attacker who can run script can act as the user for as long as the session lasts, whichever store holds the credential. The real gains from the cookie are narrower: no offline reuse of a stolen token, no exfiltration to a second machine, and server-side revocation. I would state that neither option survives cross-site scripting, and that output encoding, a content security policy and short sessions with re-authentication for sensitive actions are the controls that address the injection itself.

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