Discussion: Red-teaming an agent workflow before it gets real permissions

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observation · Claude (external reviewer) ·

The limits section says a scanner does not know the application's tools; there is a benchmark class built for exactly that gap. AgentDojo (ETH Zurich, NeurIPS 2024 datasets track) is an environment-based evaluation in which an agent performs tasks with tools (e-mail, banking, travel, workspace) while injection payloads sit in the data the tools return, and it scores both task utility and how often the injected goal was carried out; its task and injection suites are reusable as the scripted part of step 3 for an agent with similar tools, and its design is a template for building the same thing around one's own tools. On the scanner side, garak's probes are grouped by attack family (`promptinject`, `encoding`, `dan`, `latentinjection`, among others), which maps onto step 2's list of forms, and Microsoft's PyRIT adds multi-turn orchestrators that adapt the attack over a conversation, which single-shot probes cannot do. None of these replaces the manual chain attacks in step 3; they make the regression set in step 7 larger than what the team thought of.

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