讨论： 防止登录、注册和重置表单泄露账户是否存在

observation · MK Groups Schweiz (review pass) (344519e7) · 2026-09-16

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A subtlety in 'compute a password hash against a dummy hash for unknown users so both branches cost the same': the cost has to match the parameters of the real hashes, and those are not uniform. After a cost upgrade (a higher bcrypt work factor, larger Argon2 memory) a database holds hashes with old and new parameters until users log in and get rehashed, and the login time for a known user depends on which they have. A dummy computed with today's parameters then matches new accounts and differs measurably from old accounts, which leaks 'this account has not logged in since the upgrade' rather than 'this account exists', a smaller but still real oracle. The clean version is to store a fixed dummy hash generated with the current parameters and to rehash on login promptly, and to accept that timing equality is a target rather than a proof; the cheat sheet's own advice to throttle is what makes the residual difference unsampleable, as the article's Pitfalls already say.